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This paper is an empirical examination of the existence of the inside bank premium arising from 
relationship banking, which is predicted in the extant theoretical models. These models predict that 
the contracted interest rate of a loan extended by an inside bank when there exist asymmetries 
between the inside bank and outside banks, such as the information advantage of the inside bank or 
the implicit insurance and other borrower-specific services exclusively provided by the inside bank, 
is higher than that without such asymmetries. Our statistical estimations are based on the dataset 
collected through the survey for small and medium-sized firms in Japan, which were designed to 
contain the questions about a firm's loan application process, and the agreed-upon loan terms that 
are crucial to our tests. Our estimations show that such an inside bank premium is 30-50 basis 
points on average for short-term loans. This is economically significant for the median short-term 
interest rate of 1.9 %. The subsample regressions show that this premium is more likely to come 
from the implicit insurance and that this premium is more significant for smaller inside banks in 
more competitive loan markets.   
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A number of theoretical models have shown that a bank that maintains long-term and exclu-
sive lending relationship with an informationally opaque ﬁrm, such as a small ﬁrm that is not
listed on the stock market, can earn a positive rent despite the competitive pressures in the
loan markets. The ﬁrst strand of studies shows that such a bank, which is often referred to as
an inside bank, a relational bank, or a main bank in the literature, acquires proprietary infor-
mation that is accessible only through the existing lending relationship and as a result gains
the rent arising from the information advantage over rival lenders (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992;
Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999; von Thadden, 2004; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). The second strand
of studies shows that a bank can earn a quasi-rent by strategically establishing the reputation
that it is not only competent in collecting proprietary information but also able to tell apart
clients under temporary distress from those under permanent ones by utilizing the collected
proprietary information and to ﬂexibly respond to the renegotiations with the former (Chem-
manur and Fulghieri, 1994; Din¸ c, 2000). Similarly, a bank may earn a premium for an implicit
insurance against such liquidity shortage of a repeated borrower (Osano and Tsutsui, 1985).1
The third strand of studies points out that the inside bank may diﬀerentiate its services from
those of rivals, for example, by providing borrower-speciﬁc consulting services that improve the
success probability of its borrowers based on the collected client-speciﬁc proprietary information
(Boot and Thakor, 2000; Yafeh and Yosha, 2001). It is well understood that these activities,
collectively known as relationship banking, enhance the credit availability not only to the ﬁrms
that keep close preexisting relationships with their inside banks but also to the ﬁrms without
such relationships since banks that are willing to engage in relationship banking are also will-
ing to preemptively establish and dominate the lending relationship with a ﬁrm ahead of rivals
(Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1995).
Thus, the feasibility of relationship banking, which potentially has signiﬁcant impacts on
1A number of empirical studies provide evidence supportive of the positive impact of a bank-ﬁrm relationship
on credit availability of small ﬁrms (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Jiangli
et al., 2008).
2the credit availability to informationally opaque ﬁrms, inevitably depends on the possibility
that an inside bank can earn a rent by developing such asymmetry between the inside bank
and outside banks. A number of empirical studies provide indirect evidence supportive of the
existence of such rent earned by the inside bank. For example, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) ﬁnd
that Japanese listed companies aﬃliated with an industrial group of ﬁrms linked through cross-
shareholding paid higher interest costs until the 1980s. Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) ﬁnd
that, in Belgium, the interest rate is higher for ﬁrms that maintain a longer lending relationship
with their main bank.2 Schenone (2009) ﬁnd that the interest rate imposed by an inside bank
depicts a U-shaped curve against the length of the relationship before the initial public oﬀering
(IPO), whereas it turns decreasing after the IPO in the U.S. Several studies estimate positive
switching costs in switching main banks in Norway (Kim et al., 2003) and Bolivia (Ioannidou
and Ongena, 2010).
All these ﬁndings are suggestive of the existence of the rents earned by inside banks. However,
an empirical question remains, namely, what is the primary source of these rents? The primary
objective of this paper is to move the empirical study on this question one step ahead by
implementing an empirical strategy that is more tightly in alignment with the theoretical model
of the lending competition among an inside bank and outside banks with the dataset collected
from a survey that we originally designed.
The simpliﬁed versions of the existing analytical models presented in the next section show,
ﬁrst, that a ﬁrm almost surely borrows from a single bank among competing banks if there
exists either the information advantage of the inside bank or the relation-speciﬁc beneﬁt of
the continuing relationship with the inside bank, such as the implicit insurance driven by the
reputational motivation of the inside bank or diﬀerentiated consulting services. In contrast,
a ﬁrm borrows from both the inside bank and outside banks simultaneously with a positive
2In contrast, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant tendency, while
Berger and Udell (1995) and Bharath et al. (2009) ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant impact on contracts of lines of
credit of small businesses and on syndicated loan contracts of listed companies, respectively. Recent empirical
studies ﬁnd evidence supportive of rents that banks, but not necessarily inside banks, obtain. Santos and Winton
(2008) ﬁnd that credit spreads get disproportionately higher in a recession for ﬁrms without an access to the
public debt market than for those with it. Hale and Santos (2009) ﬁnd that credit spreads of companies with
high credit ratings diminish signiﬁcantly after their bond IPOs.
3probability if these asymmetries do not exist among competing banks.3 Second, the interest
rate agreed upon with the inside bank is always higher in the former case of a single lender than
in the latter case of multiple lenders despite the competitive bidding of the banks.
We made use of these properties to test the existence of the rent resulting from the asymmetry
between the inside bank and outside banks; namely, we test whether a ﬁrm’s borrowing rate
contracted with the inside bank when it is the sole lender is signiﬁcantly higher than the rate
contracted with the inside bank when the ﬁrm borrows from multiple banks. We call this gap
in contracted interest rates of the inside bank the inside bank premium. The existence of the
asymmetry between the inside bank and outside banks is not rejected if the inside bank premium
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Many of the existing empirical studies on this subject had looked mainly at the diﬀerence
between the cost of borrowing from inside banks and the cost of borrowing from outside banks
since they focused on the relational-contract aspect of relationship banking that are presented
by the earlier literature (Bolton and Sharfstein, 1990; Boot and Thakor, 1994). However, this
identiﬁcation strategy is not necessarily the best one in estimating the the possible rent for the
inside bank resulting from relationship banking. Indeed, it is possible to verify that asymmetric
information per se does not yield the diﬀerence between the mean of contracted interest rates
of informed banks and that of uninformed banks if the lending competition is formulated as
a ﬁrst-price auction under asymmetric information (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983; Rajan,
1992). Our simple analytical model that assumes a beneﬁt for a borrower to continue a lending
relationship with an inside bank also predicts that the estimated inside bank premium is less
biased toward zero than the interest-rate diﬀerence between the inside bank and outside banks.
For these reasons, instead of adopting the traditional strategy, we focus on the inside bank
premium, on which the analytical model provides us with a unique testable prediction.
Another novel contribution of our empirical study is the use of a unique dataset based on
3On this point, Black (2009) analytically and empirically shows that the outside bank is less likely to win in
lending competition as the informational transparency with respect to the creditworthiness of a borrower improves.
Our statement here does not contradict this result because what we are looking at is the probability that both
an inside bank and outside banks simultaneously lend.
4the originally designed survey questions. We used the dataset based on the Fact Finding Survey
on Transactions between Enterprises and Financial Institutions, which was designed by the
members of the Study Group on Changes in Financial and Industrial Structures at the Research
Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI) in Japan, including ourselves, and was
conducted by RIETI in February 2008. To our great advantage in light of our research agenda,
we originally designed the questions about a ﬁrm’s loan application process, the agreed terms
of contracts with its largest and second-largest lenders, and the detailed information on the
relationship with each of them including services purchased in addition to loans and the ﬁrm’s
subjective evaluation of the lenders’ behavior, which can serve as a proxy for the reputation
of lenders. Assuming that the bank from which a ﬁrm obtains the largest loan outstanding is
the bank that corresponds to the theoretical inside bank, we empirically examine the average
diﬀerence between the contracted interest rate of a short-term loan extended by the inside bank
when it is the sole lender and the rate when both the inside bank and outside banks lend
simultaneously, after controlling for loan contract characteristics including collateral coverage
and other additional services provided by each bank as well as bank- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes.
The results of the regressions, which are based on the system of equations that characterize
the propositions directly drawn from our analytical model, show that the inside bank premium
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated average premium on short-term loans is
30-50 basis points. It is economically signiﬁcant for the median short-term borrowing interest
rate of 1.9 percent.
In addition, the subsample regressions show that this premium does not diﬀer by whether
a ﬁrm perceives that the inside bank knows the unquantiﬁable strengths of the ﬁrm at least as
well as outside banks, while the premium is more signiﬁcantly observed in ﬁrms whose primary
measure in case of a temporary liquidity shortage is to ask for additional loans to the inside
bank. This ﬁnding suggests that the information advantage of the inside bank is insuﬃcient
for generating the inside bank premium but that the ability or willingness of the inside bank to
exclusively provide a borrower with the implicit insurance by utilizing the information advantage
over rival banks is required for it. Additional subsample regressions also show that the inside
5bank premium is more signiﬁcant statistically and economically when the size of an inside bank
is smaller and the lending market is more competitive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the simple analytical model is
introduced and the testable propositions that address the existence of the asymmetries between
the inside bank and outside banks are derived. In Section 3, our empirical identiﬁcation strategy
based on the analytical model demonstrated in Section 2 is proposed. In Section 4, our unique
dataset is illustrated. In Section 5, the baseline results are reported. In Section 6, the subsample
regression results are presented. Section 7 is the conclusion.
2 Theory
The existing theory provides various explanations for the rent that an inside bank can expect
from maintaining a lending relationship with a borrower. The ﬁrst strand of theoretical studies
shows that proprietary information that an inside bank has exclusively accumulated during the
course of repeated transactions with a ﬁrm yields information rents to the inside bank despite
the competitive pressures from rivals (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; von Thadden, 2004). We call
this theoretical prediction the information hypothesis. The second strand of theoretical studies
shows that the lending relationship with an inside bank serves as an implicit insurance against
temporal liquidity shortages of ﬁrms. Firms that perceive this insurance valuable are willing
to pay an insurance premium in the form of higher borrowing interest rates on loans. Thus,
an inside bank that has established a reputation that it is competent in collecting proprietary
information and telling apart temporary distressed clients from permanently distressed ones
and is willing to respond properly to the renegotiation with the former can earn quasi-rents
even in ﬁerce lending competition (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Din¸ c, 2000).4 We call this
theoretical prediction simply the insurance hypothesis. In our simple model, the other beneﬁts
for borrowers to maintain a lending relationship with the inside bank, such as borrower-speciﬁc
advice and other additional services, are captured in almost the same way as the model of the
4Osano and Tsutsui (1985) show theoretically and empirically the possible existence of the implicit insurance
by intertemporally smoothing interest rates under the assumption that borrowers are more strongly risk-averse
than lenders.
6implicit insurance. Nonetheless, we name the eﬀect of the beneﬁt the insurance hypothesis in
order to keep the exposition simpler.
Both hypotheses predict that the rent that arises from the information advantage or the
implicit insurance is reﬂected in the interest rate on a loan extended by the inside bank, which
is increasing in the information advantage of the inside bank over rivals and the value of the
implicit insurance to a ﬁrm. Furthermore, a ﬁrm almost surely borrows from a single bank if
these asymmetries exist in spite of the competitive bidding by the inside and outside banks, while
the ﬁrm borrows simultaneously from both the inside bank and outside banks with a positive
probability otherwise. In this section, we elucidate this proposition underlying our empirical
strategy to identify and estimate the inside bank premium.
Needless to say, these hypotheses only partially explain the diﬀerence of interest rates between
an inside bank and outside banks. The diﬀerence in collateral coverage or ﬁnancing costs among
the competing banks also brings about a diﬀerence in loan interest rates. This point is noted
later in this section.
2.1 Setup
We suppose a loan market in which a ﬁrm (potential borrower), an inside bank that has already
extended a loan to the ﬁrm in the past, and N outside banks that have never done so exist.5 All
agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. The detailed assumptions for each agent are as follows.
A ﬁrm plans a project that costs I and yields a revenue equal to (1 + v)I (v > 0) in state
S (success) or 0 in state F (failure). The ﬁrm applies for a loan I to the inside bank and n
outside banks. It chooses the oﬀer that maximizes its total expected return. We assume that
the size of the project is suﬃciently small so that each bank does not set the upper limit for
loans extended at a level lower than I. The ﬁrm repays the face value of the loan in state S,
while the collateral, which is mentioned later, is seized in state F. We assume that the ﬁrm has
5Here, we assume this extreme situation to keep the exposition simple. However, the point is that the inside
bank has the strongest relationship with the ﬁrm among competing banks. The subsequent argument does not
qualitatively change as long as one bank maintains a stronger relationship than the other banks.
7the same information as that of the most informed bank and knows which bank is the inside
bank.
The inside bank and N outside banks have the common prior belief regarding the success
probability of the project Prob(S) = ® and Prob(F) = 1 ¡ ®. This represents, for example,
the publicly available ﬁnancial statement, the external credit score of the ﬁrm, or its public
reputation. The inside bank and outside banks competitively and simultaneously bid the interest
rates ri and ro, respectively. The ratios of the amount of a loan covered by the collateral, which
we assume are exogenously given and publicly observable, are denoted by ci for the inside bank
and co for outside banks. Financing costs for the inside bank and outside banks are denoted by
½i and ½o, respectively. We also assume
®(v ¡ ¯ ½) + (1 ¡ ®)(c ¡ 1 ¡ ¯ ½) > 0; (1)
where ¯ ½ ´ max[½i;½o]; c ´ min[ci;co]; this inequality assures that at least a bank is willing to
oﬀer a loan ex ante. Finally, we assume that each bank wins with an equal probability when
they oﬀer the rates that are indiﬀerent to the ﬁrm.
2.2 The information hypothesis
To show the impact of private information that the inside bank exclusively obtains on the inter-
est rate of a loan extended by the inside bank, we add the following assumptions regarding the
private information. First, we assume that the inside bank has private information si 2 [s; ¯ s]
that is not observable by outside banks. si is assumed to be distributed according to the prob-
ability density function f(sijstate) conditional on state = S;F. The corresponding cumulative
distribution function is denoted by F(sijstate). We also assume the following standard common
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8A simple calculation shows that the likelihood ratio dominance (2) implies;






8si 2 [s; ¯ s]: (5)
The inside bank updates their belief on the success probability of the ﬁrm from ® to ¯i in
the Bayesian manner after obtaining the private signal si;
¯i ´
®f(sijS)
®f(sijS) + (1 ¡ ®)f(sijF)
: (6)
Based on this updated belief, the inside bank bids an interest rate ri(si) in the lending com-
petition. We focus on the case in which ri(si) is monotonically decreasing in si. To make the
exposition simpler, we assume that
1 ¡ ®
®






This assumption ensures that the inside bank always participates in the competitive bidding.
Dropping this assumption does not change the statement in Proposition 1 qualitatively. We
assume ci = co = c and ½i = ½o = ½ in order to keep the exposition simpler.
The inside bank and N outside banks play a ﬁrst-price auction under asymmetric information
for a loan. The expected return of each bank is
¼o(ro) = f(1 ¡ G(ro))p + 1 ¡ pgN¡1 £
n
F(ri¡1
(ro)jS)®(ro ¡ ½) + F(ri¡1
(ro)jF)(1 ¡ ®)(c ¡ 1 ¡ ½)
o
I; (8)
¼i(ri) = f(1 ¡ G(ri))p + 1 ¡ pgN ©
¯i(ri ¡ ½) + (1 ¡ ¯i)(c ¡ 1 ¡ ½)
ª
I; (9)
where G(¢) is the cumulative distribution function (mixed strategy) of ro, ri¡1 is the inverse
function of ri(si), and p is the probability of an outside bank to participate in the competition.
By applying the methodology presented in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) and applied in
Rajan (1992), we can derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the lending competition as is
summarized in the next proposition. The proof of the proposition is presented in Appendix 1. 6
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f(sijS) if both the inside bank and outside banks are informed.
However, the subsequent argument does not change qualitatively by (5).
9Proposition 1 In the equilibrium of the loan competition under asymmetric information among
the inside bank and outside banks, the equilibrium oﬀer rate of the inside bank is
ri(si) = ½ +
F(sijF)(1 ¡ ®)
F(sijS)®
(1 + ½ ¡ c): (10)
Each outside bank bids an interest rate according to the mixed strategy with the cumulative
distribution:
G(ro) = 1 ¡ fF(ri¡1
(ro)jS)g1=N; (11)
where ri¡1 is the inverse function of Equation (10). Either an inside bank or an outside bank
lends almost surely all the amount demanded by ﬁrm I.
This loan rate is higher than that under symmetric information where no bank has private
information, which is equal to
ri = ½ +
1 ¡ ®
®
(1 + ½ ¡ c): (12)
The premium arising from the information advantage results from the winner’s curse against
outside banks. If an outside bank wins a lending competition, the outside bank recognizes that
the better-informed inside bank oﬀered a rate higher than its oﬀer because the inside bank
received negative information about the borrower’s creditworthiness (see the proof of Lemma
2 in Appendix 1). The inside bank never suﬀers from this problem because outside banks are
uninformed and the inside bank knows that their oﬀer rates do not reﬂect any information. To
cover the loss from this winner’s curse problem, uninformed outside banks are urged to oﬀer
higher interest rates. This strategy by outside banks yields an opportunity for the inside bank
to earn a rent.
2.3 The insurance hypothesis
The beneﬁt for a ﬁrm of continuing a bank-ﬁrm relationship, such as the implicit insurance
against a tentative ﬁnancial distress and ﬁrm-speciﬁc advice provided by the inside bank, can
yield qualitatively the same consequence as Proposition 1. To illustrate this point, we now
assume that the inside and outside banks have symmetric information and that the value for
10the ﬁrm of the implicit insurance by the inside bank is positive and denoted by ÃI > 0. This
represents, for example, the expected increment in the net present value of the ﬁrm by receiving
an emergency loan from the inside bank in the case of a temporal liquidity shortage in the future,
which is not explicitly modeled in our static setup to keep the exposition as parsimonious as
possible.7 This beneﬁt for the ﬁrm can also be interpreted as the beneﬁt from ﬁrm-speciﬁc
consulting services or the other services additionally provided by the inside bank8. This beneﬁt
keeps its positive value if the ﬁrm keeps surviving, i.e., in state S, and maintains the lending
relationship with the inside bank, while its value becomes zero if the ﬁrm faces the permanent
negative shock, i.e., in state F. If the lending relationship with the inside bank is terminated,
the value of the implicit insurance from the previous inside bank becomes zero and the implicit
insurance contract with the new inside bank begins. The value of the new implicit insurance is
assumed to be equal to ±ÃI; ± < 1. This value is smaller than that with the original inside bank
since it is likely to take a while for an outside bank to establish the new bank-ﬁrm relationship.
If at least a bank oﬀers a loan to the ﬁrm, the expected return to the ﬁrm when the lender
is an inside bank is
¼
f
i = ®(v ¡ ri + Ã)I ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ciI: (13)
The expected return to the ﬁrm when the lender is an outside bank is
¼f
o = ®(v ¡ ro + ±Ã)I ¡ (1 ¡ ®)coI: (14)





ro ¸ ˜ ri; where ˜ ri ´ ri ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Ã +
1 ¡ ®
®
(ci ¡ co): (15)
We assume that Ã > 0, ± < 1, ½o = ½i = ½, ci = co = c in order to keep the exposition as simple
as possible throughout the remainder of this subsection.9
7For more detailed explicit formulation with a dynamic setup, see Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994).
8Another speciﬁcation for the eﬀect of the consulting service is an increase in the success probability ® (Boot
and Thakor, 2000). It can be easily veriﬁed by following the same procedure presented in this subsection that
this alternative speciﬁcation also reaches the qualitatively same conclusion as Proposition 1.
9If the depositors or shareholders of the inside bank expect that the provision of the implicit insurance can
11The proﬁts of the inside and outside banks when they win the lending competition are,
respectively,
¼i(˜ ri) = ®(ri ¡ ½)I + (1 ¡ ®)(c ¡ ½ ¡ 1)I;
= ®
¡
˜ ri ¡ ½ + (1 ¡ ±)Ã
¢
I + (1 ¡ ®)(c ¡ ½ ¡ 1)I: (16)
¼o(ro) = ®(ro ¡ ½)I + (1 ¡ ®)(c ¡ ½ ¡ 1)I: (17)
The inside bank and N outside banks play a Bertrand competition with asymmetric marginal
costs for the loan contract. Clearly the inside bank is advantageous because ¼i > ¼o if ˜ ri = ro.
Therefore, by the standard argument in the Bertrand competition under asymmetric marginal
costs, it is readily shown that the inside bank bids down the rate ri to a level at which no outside
bank could expect a strictly positive return in the Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
˜ ri ¡ ½ =
1 ¡ ®
®
(1 + ½ ¡ c); (18)
and the inside bank wins almost surely. Namely, in the equilibrium, the inside bank bids
ri ¡ ½ =
1 ¡ ®
®
(1 + ½ ¡ c) + (1 ¡ ±)Ã: (19)
The expected return for each bank is
¼i = ®(1 ¡ ±)ÃI; (20)
¼o = 0: (21)
Each outside bank independently bids an interest rate according to the mixed strategy that
satisﬁes
((1 ¡ H(ro))q + 1 ¡ q)¼i(ro) = ®(1 ¡ ±)ÃI; (22)
increase the credit risk of the bank, then they would require higher capital costs. This may render the ﬁnancing
cost of the inside bank higher than that of the outside bank. If the proﬁt of the inside bank is still higher than
that of an outside bank at ˜ r
i = r
o despite the increase in ½
i, then the subsequent analysis does not change
qualitatively. Otherwise, the inside bank does not have an incentive to serve the implicit insurance for the ﬁrm,
and the problem is thus reduces to the standard Bertrand competition. Thus, the eﬀect on the ﬁnancing cost
does not qualitatively alter the implication stated below. To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we omit
this eﬀect in the analysis.
12for any ro in the equilibrium, where H(¢) is the i.i.d. mixed strategy or the cumulative distri-
bution function of the oﬀered rate by each outside bank, ro, and q is the i.i.d. probability that
each outside bank will participate in the lending competition.
If Ã = 0 or ± = 1, then the problem is reduced to a symmetric Bertrand competition.
Therefore, the inside bank and outside banks bid the zero-proﬁt interest rate; ½+ 1¡®
® (1+½¡c).
They win with an equal probability. The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium of the loan pricing competition under Ã > 0 and ± < 1, the
inside bank wins the loan contract almost surely by oﬀering the rate equal to
ri = ½ +
1 ¡ ®
®
(1 + ½ ¡ c) + (1 ¡ ±)Ã: (23)
Outside banks bid independently according to the mixed strategy fH(ro);qg that satisﬁes Equation
(22) for any ro 2 [½ + 1¡®
® (1 + ½ ¡ c);V ].
If Ã = 0 or ± = 1, the inside bank and outside banks win the lending competition with an




(1 + ½ ¡ c): (24)
The rate (23) is strictly higher than the rate (24) if Ã > 0 and ± < 1.
Thus, under the insurance hypothesis, we obtain the result similar to that in Proposition
1; i.e., the inside bank can contract a higher interest rate when it generates a relation- speciﬁc
beneﬁt for a borrower.
2.4 Other factors that inﬂuence the inside bank premium
We summarize the other factors, namely collateralization and ﬁnancing costs of banks, that can
contribute to the diﬀerence between the contracted rate of the inside bank and that of outside
banks. In contrast to the asymmetry due to the implicit insurance or the information asymmetry,
these factors do not necessarily give the inside bank an advantage. We need to control for these
observable factors when testing the insurance hypothesis and the information hypothesis.
132.4.1 Eﬀect of the diﬀerences in the ratios covered by collaterals.
Now, we assume that Ã = 0, ½o = ½i = ½, ci > co, and the information is symmetric in order
to elucidate the impact of the diﬀerence in collateralization on contracted interest rates. If
collateralization is exogenously determined, then banks play the simple Bertrand competition
(see the bank proﬁt (16) and (17)). In the equilibrium, each bank wins with an equal probability
by setting the rate ˜ ri = ro, and each bank earns zero proﬁt. The loan interest rates that the
inside bank and outside banks oﬀer are, respectively,
ri = ½ +
1 ¡ ®
®
(1 + ½ ¡ ci); (25)
ro = ½ +
1 ¡ ®
®
(1 + ½ ¡ co): (26)
The ﬁrm is indiﬀerent in borrowing from either of oﬀering banks while the contracted rate is
decreasing in the collateral coverage. In contrast to the asymmetry discussed in the previous
subsections, a ﬁrm may borrow from both the inside bank and outside banks simultaneously.
Clearly, the interest rate is decreasing in collateral coverage.
However, if the collateral coverage is endogenously determined as is presented in the screening
model (Bester, 1985) or the moral hazard model (Boot et al., 1991; Bester, 1994), the last point
can change. Especially, the moral hazard model predicts that both interest rates and pledged
collateral are decreasing in the borrower’s creditworthiness. Thus, we may observe a positive
correlation between the lending interest rate and the pledged collateral in data if this prediction
is signiﬁcant.
2.4.2 Eﬀect of the diﬀerences in ﬁnancing costs.
Next, we assume that Ã = 0, ci = co = c and the information is symmetric in order to elucidate
the impact of the diﬀerence in ﬁnancing costs on contracted interest rates. In this case, banks
play the Bertrand competition with asymmetric marginal costs. Let us denote the jth lowest
ﬁnancing cost among N +1 banks by ½(j). Then, the standard analysis of the Bertrand compe-
tition with asymmetric marginal costs shows that the bank with the lowest ﬁnancing cost wins
14the loan contract almost surely in the Nash equilibrium by oﬀering
r(1) = ½(2) +
1 ¡ ®
®
(1 + ½(2) ¡ c): (27)
Thus, the lowest contracted rate is increasing in the ﬁnancing cost of the second-lowest ﬁnancing
cost.
3 Identiﬁcation Strategy
Propositions 1 and 2 show that a contracted loan interest rate extended by the inside bank
is higher when the information advantage for the inside bank and/or the implicit insurance
provided by the inside bank exists than otherwise. We refer to this diﬀerence in interest rates due
to information advantage and/or implicit insurance by the inside bank premium. The primary
purpose of this study is to empirically examine the existence of this inside bank premium and
to estimate it after controlling for the other factors that potentially aﬀect it, which have been
presented in the previous section and can be explicitly controlled by the variables available
in our bank-ﬁrm matching dataset. In this section, we illustrate how to identify the inside
bank premium due to the unobservable factors, such as asymmetric information and implicit
insurance.
3.1 The inside bank premium
To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we assume that ﬁnancing costs of banks and the
ratio of collateral to a loan are controlled so that they are regarded as identical for all banks;
i.e., ½(j) = ½ for any j and ci = co = c in this subsection. The analysis in the previous section
shows that the ﬁrm borrows from both the inside bank and outside banks simultaneously only
when both (i) Ã = 0 (no implicit insurance) and (ii) symmetric information hold. The ﬁrm
borrows from one single bank if any of these conditions does not hold (Propositions 1 and 2).
In other words, if the ﬁrm borrows from multiple banks, then it implies that both (i) and (ii)
hold. Therefore, the observed equilibrium rate contracted between the ﬁrm and the inside bank








(1 + ½ ¡ c): (28)
If the ﬁrm borrows only from the inside bank, then the observable equilibrium rate contracted
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® (1 + ½ ¡ c) + (1 ¡ ±)Ã if Ã > 0, ± < 1, and sym. info.;
½ +
F(sijF)(1¡®)
F(sijS)® (1 + ½ ¡ c) if Ã = 0 or ± = 1, and asym. info.;
½ + 1¡®
® (1 + ½ ¡ c) if Ã = 0 or ± = 1, and sym. info:
(29)
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® (1 + ½ ¡ c) > 0 if Ã = 0 or ± = 1, and asym. info.;
0 if Ã = 0 or ± = 1, and sym. info:
(30)
The inequality in the second case arises from the assumption (4), which ensures the informa-
tiveness of the private signal si.10 Thus, the interest rate of the inside bank is higher when a
ﬁrm borrows only from the inside bank than when it borrows from multiple banks if and only if
either the implicit insurance or the information advantage exists. In other words, we can infer
the existence and the impact of these unobservable factors by estimating the diﬀerence between
a ﬁrm’s interest rate contracted with the inside bank when it is the sole lender and the rate
when the ﬁrm borrows from multiple banks simultaneously after controlling for the each lender’s
ﬁnancing cost and its collateral coverage.
10To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we do not list the case of Ã > 0 and asymmetric information.
However, it is easy to check that r
ij single inside bank = ½ +
F(sijF)(1¡®)
F(sijS)® (1 + ½ ¡ c) + (1 ¡ ±)Ã. The subsequent
argument in this case is the same as the case of Ã > 0 or asymmetric information.
163.2 Beneﬁt of the identiﬁcation strategy based on the inside bank premium
Many of the existing empirical studies looked at the diﬀerence in the contracted interest rate of
an inside bank and that of outside banks after classifying lenders into inside banks or outside
banks according to a certain criteria regarding the length of relationship or the share of checking
accounts. However, our simple model shows that looking at the inside bank premium is better in
detecting and estimating the quasi-rent resulting from relationship banking than such traditional
identiﬁcation strategy.
First, the model of the information hypothesis predicts that the distribution of the lowest
interest rate oﬀered by N outside banks is 1 ¡ F(ri¡1(ro)jS) (Eq.11). The model predicts
that the distribution of the interest rate oﬀered by the inside bank is 1 ¡ ®F(ri¡1(ri)jS) ¡
(1 ¡ ®)F(ri¡1(ri)jF) (Eq.10) conditional on the creditworthiness of each ﬁrm ®. However,
the dataset is often collected from an ex post survey targeting at ﬁrms that survives until the
time of the survey. In this case, the dataset consists only of those in the successful state S.
Therefore, the distribution of the interest oﬀered by the inside bank is likely to be equal to
1¡F(ri¡1(ri))jS). Consequently, the distribution of the oﬀered interest rate of the inside bank
and the lowest one among those of N outside banks have the identical distribution in this case,
and so the expected contracted rate of the inside bank E(rijri · ro) is equal to that of the
outside bank E(rojro · ri) in theory. Thus, the diﬀerence in the contracted rate between the
inside bank and the outside bank does not capture the quasi-rent resulting from the information
advantage at all. The inside bank premium proposed in this paper is free from this problem.
Second, the inside bank premium is better as the measure of the quasi-rent of relationship
banking also in the context of the model of the insurance hypothesis. To show this point, let us
assume that the probability for a ﬁrm obtains a loan exclusively from its inside bank because
of the beneﬁt of continuing the lending relationship is Á 2 (0;1). In this case, the contracted




deﬁned by the ﬁrst case in Eq.
(29) according to the model of the insurance hypothesis. The probability that the ﬁrm obtains
a loan exclusively from its inside bank by accident despite that it does not recognize the beneﬁt
17of continuing relationship is Á0 2 (0;1). The contracted interest rate of the inside bank in this




deﬁned by Eq. (28). The probability that the ﬁrm borrows
from both the inside bank and an outside bank is » 2 (0;1). Lastly, the probability that the
ﬁrm borrows exclusively from the outside bank is 1 ¡ Á ¡ Á0 ¡ ». In these latter two cases, the





Under these notations, the expected value of the contracted interest rate of the inside bank
and that of an outside bank are, respectively,
E(rij˜ ri · ro) =
Á


















Thus, the diﬀerence between them is
E(rij˜ ri · ro) ¡ E(roj˜ ri ¸ ro) =
Á














Á + Á0 + »
: (33)
Under the above notation, the expected value of the contracted interest rate of the inside
bank when it is the sole lender is
E(rijthe inside bank is the sole lender)
=
Á











That of the inside bank when multiple banks lend to the ﬁrm is





Thus, the expected value of the inside bank premium is equal to

















Á + Á0 : (36)
18This is clearly closer to the diﬀerence of the beneﬁt of relationship between the inside bank and
an outside bank (1 ¡ ±)Ã than (33). Thus, the inside bank premium is less biased toward zero
than the diﬀerence in the contracted interest rates of the inside bank and that of an outside
bank. For these two reasons, we focus on the inside bank premium in our statistical analysis.
3.3 Estimation model
Practically, we cannot simultaneously observe rijsingle inside bank and rijmultiple banks of an identical
ﬁrm by construction. Therefore, we adopt the dummy variable approach with the following linear
regression model, which is the linear approximation of the equilibrium contracted rate between
a ﬁrm and the inside bank;
ri
m = ¯0 + ¯1ci
m + ¯2½i
m + ¯3½o
m + ¯4®m + ¯5Dm + ²m; (37)
where m (= 1;¢¢¢ ;M) is the index of ﬁrms, Dm is the dummy variable which is equal to
one if a ﬁrm m borrows only from the inside bank and zero otherwise, ®m represents the
public information about the creditworthiness of ﬁrm m, ²m is the mean-zero error term that
is identically and independently distributed across ﬁrms, and ¯’s are the coeﬃcients to be
estimated. In the model of the information hypothesis, the right-hand side of this equation is
supposed to contain the term with respect to the outside banks’ collateral coverage co, while this
term does not emerge in the model for the insurance hypothesis. In the empirical analysis, we
drop the term of co because the information of co is not available when the inside bank is the sole
lender. The estimated ¯5 captures the average of the inside bank premiums over all sample ﬁrms.
If it is not signiﬁcantly positive, both the insurance hypothesis and the information hypothesis
are rejected, at least, on average.
Among the explanatory variables, the public information of the creditworthiness of ﬁrm
m, ®m, is most likely to contain a component that is unobservable to analysts although it
is observable to all the banks in the market. If this is the case, the true ®m is the sum of
the component observable to analysts ˜ ®m and the component unobservable to analysts ²®
m.
19Substituting ®m = ˜ ®m + ²®
m into Equation (37) yields
ri
m = ¯0 + ¯1ci
m + ¯2½i
m + ¯3½o
m + ¯4˜ ®m + ¯5Dm + ´m; (38)
where ´m = ¯4²®
m + ²m. This linear equation is the baseline model that we in fact use in
our regression analyses. However, this baseline model potentially suﬀers from a simultaneous
equation bias, since the ﬁrst term in ´m is potentially positively correlated with the dummy
variable Dm, as is shown in the next subsection.
3.4 Choice of either a single inside lender or multiple lenders
Firm m borrows solely from the inside bank if and only if Inequality (4) strictly holds; i.e.,
ro
m > ˜ ri
m; where ˜ ri
m ´ ri






By substituting the equilibrium oﬀer rates ri
m into this inequality and linearizing it, we can
restate this condition as follows; a ﬁrm m borrows only from the inside bank if and only if
ro
m ¡ ri
m ¼ °0 + °1ci
m + °2½i
m + °3½o
m + °4®m + ºm;
= °0 + °1ci
m + °2½i
m + °3½o
m + °4˜ ®m + ³m > 0; (39)
where ³m ´ °4²®
m + ºm. ºm is a mean-zero error term that possibly includes the deviation from
the mean of the rates oﬀered by outside banks that follow the mixed strategy (Propositions 1 and
2). The right-hand side is supposed to include the term of co in the model for the information
hypothesis, but we omit it for the same reason as the term in the interest rate equation (37).
The second expression in (39) comes from the equation ®m = ˜ ®m+²®
m mentioned in the previous
subsection. Since the public information unobservable to analysts ²®
m is included in both ´m in
(38) and ³m in (39), these error terms are potentially correlated. In other words, we have to
treat the choice of borrowing from either the single inside bank or multiple banks as endogenous.
In the theoretical model, we eliminated the possibility that a ﬁrm’s fund demand I is so
large that the inside bank alone cannot meet it and the ﬁrm cannot help but borrow from
multiple banks. In the real world, however, we cannot rule out this case. The fund demand I is
20conceptually derived from the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization given its demand function. Therefore,
I is considered to be the increasing function of the exogenous demand shifter for the ﬁrm. To
treat the case introduced above explicitly, we include the demand shifter for ﬁrm m, such as the
total sales of the ﬁrm, in the right-hand side of Inequality (39). We also include the ﬁnancial
soundness of the inside bank into it in order to control for the borrowing ﬁrm’s incentive to keep
relationships with multiple banks expecting to avoid early liquidation due to the failure of its
inside bank and diﬃculty to obtain a loan from outside banks instead (Detragiache et al., 2000).
Moreover, we include the dummy variables indicating whether a ﬁrm purchases services from
outside banks, such as a checking account, salary wiring, and owner’s personal asset management.
These instrument variables that can be plausible excluded from the interest equation and are
denoted by a vector ·m enable us to identify the interest rate equation (38) when we estimate
¯’s in (38) and °’s in (39) simultaneously.
Our empirical results are primarily based on the simultaneous estimation of the endogenous
dummy variable model (38) and (39) under the assumption that ´m and ³m are joint-normally
distributed (standard normal for ³m) and are possibly correlated (Heckman, 1978).
4 Data
The major part of our dataset is based on a unique survey, the Fact-Finding Survey on Transac-
tions between Enterprises and Financial Institutions(hereafter referred to as the Survey), which
was originally designed by the members of the Study Group on Changes in Financial and In-
dustrial Structures at RIETI, including us, and was conducted by RIETI in February 2008.
In particular, we ourselves designed the questions about a ﬁrm’s loan application/negotiation
process, the agreed terms of contracts with its primary and secondary banks, and the detailed
information on the relationship with each of them including services purchased in addition to
loans, and the ﬁrm’s subjective evaluation of the lenders’ behavior, which can serve as a proxy
for the reputation of lenders.11 The survey questionnaires were sent out to 17,180 ﬁrms, which
11The survey consists of two major sections, one on a respondent ﬁrm’s use of trade credit and another for its
relationships with ﬁnancial institutions. We designed the latter.
21were randomly sampled by industry and size classes of employees and capital from mostly small
and medium enterprises that were registered at Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR) Ltd. Co., one
of the largest private credit-reporting companies in Japan. A total of 6,124 ﬁrms replied to it
(response rate: 36.0%).
In estimating the inside bank premium by the endogenous dummy variable model (38) and
(39), we assume that the bank that extends the largest amount of loans outstanding to the ﬁrm12
is the inside bank. We call this bank the primary bank in our subsequent empirical analyses. We
assume that the other banks are outside banks. Among outside banks, the bank that extends
the second-largest amount of loans outstanding to the ﬁrm is called the secondary bank. The
questions about each ﬁrm’s bank ﬁnancing in the survey are designed so that we can obtain
the information about terms of loans and transaction histories of both the primary bank, which
plausibly corresponds to the inside bank in the analytical model, and the secondary bank, which
is considered to be the most competitive outside bank in the model. The English translation of
relevant questions in the survey is listed in Appendix 2.
From the original sample of 6,124 ﬁrms, a small number of ﬁrms that kept anonymity in
the survey were dropped (the sample size was reduced to 6,079).13 First, listed ﬁrms were
dropped to ensure that the sample ﬁrms are not publicly transparent so that the quality of
information held by (potential) lenders is likely to be strongly asymmetric (reduced to 5,876).
The ﬁrms whose primary bank is a government ﬁnancial institution were dropped since we aim
at studying the pricing of privately underwritten loans. The ﬁrms whose primary bank is an
agricultural, a forestry or a ﬁshery cooperative, or a labor bank were dropped since the data of
these ﬁnancial institutions are unavailable. The ﬁrms whose primary bank is the Norinchukin
Bank were dropped since this institution is the central institution of an agricultural, a forestry
or a ﬁshery cooperative, whose borrowers were eliminated (reduced to 3,998). Likewise, the
ﬁrms whose secondary bank is one of the above-mentioned ﬁnancial institutions, were dropped
(reduced to 3,991). Among the remaining ﬁrms, 1,477 ﬁrms report their agreed rate on a short-
12Question 28 (1) in the survey questionnaire. See Appendix 2.
13A ﬁrm was identiﬁed by an identiﬁcation number printed on a questionnaire book. A few respondent ﬁrms,
however, intentionally erased the printed ID number in order to keep anonymity.
22term loan borrowed from their primary bank. Finally, the ﬁrms whose surveyed short-term loan
was publicly guaranteed were dropped. This is because most risks of a publicly guaranteed loan
are borne by the government rather than the underwriter herself. The base sample universe
consists of 1,135 ﬁrms for which there is no missing value for any of the independent variables
introduced below. We estimate the system of equations (38) and (39) with this base sample.
Dependent variables We use the interest rate of a short-term loan that was extended by the
primary bank within a year before the survey date, February 2008, as the dependent variable of
Equation (38).14 In the probit estimation or the linear probability estimation for the propensity
to borrow solely from the inside bank (39), we use a dummy variable which is equal to one if a
ﬁrm borrows short-term and/or long-term loans only from the primary bank or zero if it borrows
loans from both primary and secondary banks.15 We name this dummy variable DMLOAN1,
which corresponds to Dm in Equation (38). In using this dummy variable, we implicitly assume
that a ﬁrm borrows from the secondary bank ﬁrst if they need to or would like to borrow from
an outside bank.
Independent variables Measures for loan security of a primary bank ci
m are a dummy vari-
able to indicate that a loan is secured by physical collateral, COLLATERAL1, and a dummy
variable to indicate that a loan is covered by personal guarantees, PRIVATESECURITY1.16
The measure for a bank’s ﬁnancing cost ½
j
m (j = i;o) is FINANCINGCOSTj, which is
calculated by (interest expenses + general and administrative expenses)/(deposits + negotiable
CD + debentures + call money + payables under repurchase agreements + payables under
14The Bank of Japan increased its target of the unsecured overnight call rate, which is the primary instrument
for the monetary policy in Japan, from 0.25% to 0.5% on February 21, 2007. Since then, it kept the same level
of the target rate until October 31, 2008. Thus, the money-market rate within our data period is stable. For
example, the Tokyo interbank oﬀered rate (TIBOR) of one week is stable at around 0.6.
15This dummy variable is constructed from Question 29 (4) ° 3 (Appendix 2). In our theoretical model, the inside
bank premium disappears when a ﬁrm successfully borrows loans of any maturity from its secondary (outside)
bank. On the other hand, in practice, a bank likely diﬀerentiates loan rates based on their maturity. To control
for this maturity eﬀect on a loan rate, we avoided consolidating short-term loan rates and long-term loan rates
that are also asked in the Survey.
16In the current version, we do not include the variables that measure the loan security by a secondary bank
because not all of the sample ﬁrms report the information about security of a loan borrowed from their secondary
bank. Thus, including measures for c
o
m would result in a substantial reduction in sample size.
23securities lending transactions + borrowed money + foreign exchanges + short-term corporate
bonds + straight bonds + convertible bonds)£100 with respect to each of a ﬁrm’s primary and
secondary banks.
The primary measure employed for the public information of creditworthiness is a ﬁrm’s
credit score provided by TSR, SCORE. The ﬁrm size as deﬁned by the logarithm of total assets
(LNTASSET) and a dummy variable to indicate that the proportion of shares held by a ﬁrm’s
representative and her family who reside with her is more than half (OWNER) are included
to supplement SCORE. The OWNER is included, as banks are said to perceive a stronger risk
appetite in owner-managed ﬁrms.
A bank may oﬀer a lower loan rate to a ﬁrm when it earns larger fees or to a ﬁrm with larger
preexisting loans from the same bank. To control for such cross selling by a bank, we include a
set of dummy variables to indicate that a ﬁrm’s primary bank provides non-loan services to the
ﬁrm. These variables include a dummy variable to indicate that a ﬁrm holds settlement accounts
at its primary bank (SETTLE1), a dummy variable to indicate that a ﬁrm holds accounts to
wire salaries to its employees at its primary bank (SALARY1), and a dummy variable to indicate
that a ﬁrm uses personal asset management services provided by its primary bank. Similarly,
to control for a bank’s preexisting loans to a ﬁrm, we include the logarithm of the total loans
that a ﬁrm borrows from its primary bank (LNLOANS1).
We also control for the facility size of the surveyed loan extended by a ﬁrm’s primary bank
(LNSHORT1). In addition, we control for the intensity of lending competition by the Herﬁndahl
index of bank branches in each telephone area-code area where the head oﬃce of a sample ﬁrm is
located (HI) in order to address the possibility that banks are competing in a Cournot manner
for loans to ﬁrms that are intended to borrow from multiple banks. Lastly, we control for a
ﬁrm’s location by a set of region dummies as well as a ﬁrm’s industry-by-industry dummies.17
Deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, independent variables, and
instrumental variables that will be explained in the next subsection are summarized in Table
17The region dummies for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu are included.
Kanto is the base region. Industry dummies for construction, communications/transportations, general trading,
specialized trading, wholesale, retail and other industry are included. Manufacturing is the base industry.
241. As for our dependent variable and key independent variable, the average short-term interest
rate is 2.09 percent (median 1.88), and 33 percent of the sample ﬁrms that borrowed from
their primary bank did not borrow from their secondary bank. As for ﬁrm’s relationships
with their primary and secondary banks, on average, the length of the relationship with the
former is 32 years, whereas that with the latter is 24 years. Thus, we know that ﬁrms have
a longer relationship with their primary bank than with their secondary bank; however, these
relationships are generally very long.
Table 2, Panel (a) shows the preliminary evidence for the existence of inside bank premiums.
On average, the ﬁrms that borrowed from their primary bank only (in the case of DMLOAN1=1)
had to pay 24 basis points more than those that borrowed from both primary and secondary
banks (in the case of DMLOAN=0). Such a result may be a naive ﬁnding since we have not
controlled for endogeneity of DMLOAN1 or for a ﬁrm’s risk characteristics. Ultimately, this
preliminary ﬁnding needs to be scrutinized using the rigorous regression framework laid out in
the previous section.
Table 2, Panel (b) shows the diﬀerence between the contracted interest rate of the primary
bank as the proxy for the inside bank and that of the secondary bank as the proxy for an outside
bank when a ﬁrm borrows simultaneously from both of them. The interest rate of the inside
bank is larger and this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 % level. However, as is
predicted in the section of the identiﬁcation strategy (Section 3.2), the the diﬀerence is much
smaller than that in Panel (a), merely 4 basis point. It is also worth metioning that some 38 %
of the sample ﬁrms in Panel (b) report that the contracted rate of the primary bank and that
of the secondary bank is identical.
5 Result
5.1 Full sample regression
Table 3 presents the regression results of equation (38). Panel A presents the results for the
base sample, whereas Panel B presents the results for the sample of ﬁrms which subjectively
25perceive their primary bank as their “main bank.”18 When a ﬁrm does not perceive its primary
bank as its main bank, a primary bank may not suit the concept of an inside bank who is more
informed of the ﬁrm than other banks. Thus, we expect that if our developed hypotheses hold
true, the test results should appear stronger in Panel B than in Panel A.
In each Panel, column 1 presents the OLS results, whereas columns 2 and 3 present the
results when our main independent variable DMLOAN1 is regarded as endogenous. For the
instrumental variables in the ﬁrst stage regression to estimate the propensity that DMLOAN1
is equal to 1, we use the logarithm of total loans that a ﬁrm borrows from its secondary bank
(LNLOANS2), the lowest ﬁnancing cost of a private bank other than primary and secondary
banks that have at least one ordinary branch in the ﬁrm’s vicinity (FINANCINGCOST3), a
ﬁrm holds settlement accounts at its secondary bank (SETTLE2), a dummy variable to indicate
that a ﬁrm holds accounts to wire salaries to its employees at its secondary bank (SALARY2),
a dummy variable to indicate that a ﬁrm uses personal asset management services provided
by its secondary bank (PERSONAL2), a ﬁrm’s primary lender’s Basel capital adequacy ratio
(BIS), and the logarithm of a ﬁrm’s sales (LNSALES).19 The ﬁrst ﬁve instrumental variables
are the factors that aﬀect the oﬀered rate by the secondary bank. BIS is the measure for a
ﬁrm’s primary lender’s ﬁnancial health. LNSALES is an exogenous loan demand shifter of each
borrower.
In column 2, Equation (38) is estimated by the standard two-stage least square technique,
where in the ﬁrst stage, DMLOAN1 is linearly regressed on instrumental variables, which include
exogenous independent variables. In column 3, Equation (38) is estimated by the maximum
likelihood estimation method. In the MLE estimation, the likelihood that DMLOAN1 takes a
value of 1 is modeled using a probit model in which the same set of instrumental variables as
employed in column 2 is used as the independent variables.
The large F statistic for excluded instruments for the standard 2SLS regressions and small J
statistics (column 2 of Panels A and B) show that our instrumental variable regressions are valid
18This information is collected from Question 28 (2) in the survey questionnaire (Appendix 2).
19Since the instrumental variable in column 2 is the predicted value using exogenous variables only, this variable
is uncorrelated with the independent variable by construction. Thus, this instrumental variable is valid.
26whereas the statistics designed to test endogeneity of DMLOAN1 do not necessarily conﬁrm the
endogeneity of this independent variable at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level.20 It gives support
to our instrumental variables that the regression results by two diﬀerent methods (2SLS and
MLE) are almost identical. The ﬁrst-stage probit estimation results reported in column 3 in each
Panel of Table 3, which are summarized in Appendix 3 (Table A1), ensure that our instrumental
variables are valid. The coeﬃcient of LNSALES, our proxy for the loan demand shifter, is
positive and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level, implying that, as anticipated, the
larger sales increase a ﬁrm’s likelihood to borrow from both primary and secondary lenders. In
addition, the coeﬃcients of SETTLE2, SALARY2, and PERSONAL2, which are the variables
indicating whether a ﬁrm uses non-loan services from the secondary bank, are all negative
and signiﬁcant, implying that as the standard relationship lending hypothesis suggests, a ﬁrm
with a wider scope of the relationship with its secondary lender is more likely to be successful
in borrowing from that lender. The coeﬃcients of BIS are negative albeit insigniﬁcant. The
negative relationship between a ﬁrm’s lender’s ﬁnancial distress and a ﬁrm’s likelihood to choose
a single lender as opposed to multiple lenders is consistent with the theoretical prediction and the
empirical evidence of Detragiache et al. (2000). On balance, it is fair to say that our instrumental
variable results serve for our empirical objectives.
Regarding the coeﬃcients of DMLOAN1, none of them is statistically signiﬁcant for the full
sample results reported in Panel A, whereas the coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant in all
columns of Panel B at least at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level when DMLOAN1 is regarded as endogenous (columns 2 and 3). At a closer
look, the estimated coeﬃcient of DMLOAN1 in each of columns 2 and 3 is not only signiﬁcant
but also economically signiﬁcant. The results reported in Panel B indicate that a ﬁrm’s primary
bank perceived by the ﬁrm as its main bank charges 30 to 32 basis points higher when the ﬁrm
does not borrow from its secondary bank. This shows that not only is our naive ”estimate”
20If instrumental variables are not strongly correlated with endogenous variables, coeﬃcients estimated by
instrumental variable regression techniques such as 2SLS are generally inconsistent. Conventionally, the F statistic
for instrumental variables that are excluded as an independent variable in the second stage above 10 ensures their
validity. For technical discussions on the strength of instrumental variables, see Staiger and Stock (1997).
27reported in Table 2 conﬁrmed but it also is slightly underestimated. The empirically extracted
premium is substantial as the sample median of the short-term rate is merely 1.875 percent. Our
ﬁndings are consistent with our theoretical prediction summarized in Hypothesis 1. A ﬁrm’s
largest lender who is not recognized as its main bank may be a de facto outsider no matter how
large the loan outstanding from that bank stands. The fact that the estimated coeﬃcient in
Panel A is not signiﬁcant implies that the sample containing both the ﬁrms whose largest lender
is a true inside bank that are consistent with the deﬁnition of the inside bank in the analytical
model and those whose largest lender is closer to an outside bank.
Regarding other coeﬃcients, irrespectively of the employed estimation technique or sample,
the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of LNSHORTLOAN1, SCORE, FINANCINGCOST2 and
LNLOANS1 are negative, negative, positive and positive, respectively. The negative coeﬃcient
of LNSHORTLOAN1, the facility size of the short-term loan, could reﬂect the scale economy
in lending technology, i.e., the processing cost of extending each loan is ﬁxed irrespective of
the facility size, while the interest revenue for the bank is increasing in the facility size. The
negative coeﬃcient of the SCORE suggests that primary banks use public information underlying
credit scores in their pricing, at least, as a part of information about the creditworthiness of
ﬁrms. The positive coeﬃcient of FINANCINGCOST2, the ﬁnancing cost of the secondary
bank, is consistent with the statement in Section 2.4.2, a prediction derived from the Bertrand
competition model with asymmetric marginal costs. The positive coeﬃcient of LNLOAN1, the
logarithm of the total amount of all loans extended by the primary bank, suggests that a bank
regards a greater exposure to a ﬁrm as a higher risk.
6 Subsample Regressions
6.1 Firms that negotiated loans with multiple banks
The results for the sample of the ﬁrms that negotiated short-term loans with at least one more
bank along with their primary bank are shown in Table 4 . The results for the sample of the ﬁrms
that negotiated loans with at least two banks including their primary bank are shown in Panel
A, whereas the results for the sample of the ﬁrms that did so and identify their primary bank
28as their main bank are shown in Panel B. These samples are more in line with our theoretical
model, in which a ﬁrm is assumed to apply to both inside and outside banks. The results are
largely consistent with those shown in Table 3. As in Panels A and B of Table 3, the coeﬃcients
of DMLOAN1 are not signiﬁcant in Panel A where regressions are run on a full sample, but are
positive and signiﬁcant in Panel B where regressions are run on a sample of ﬁrms that identify
their largest lender as their main bank. However, in Table 4, the coeﬃcient is larger at 40 to
50 basis points and less precisely estimated than in Table 3. The larger estimate in Table 4
may indicate that the inside bank’s eﬀect on loan rates is strongly observed in the controlled
environment, which is more consistent with our theory. Yet imprecise estimates in Table 4 may
be due to the substantially smaller sample size (726 in Table 4 as opposed to 873 in Table 3)
As for other coeﬃcients, the results are largely consistent between Tables 3 and 4. The
only minor diﬀerence is that, when estimated using instrumental variables, the coeﬃcients of
PRIVATESECURITY1, which are not statistically signiﬁcant in any Panel of Table 3, are weakly
signiﬁcant in every Panel of Table 4.
6.2 The information hypothesis versus the insurance hypothesis
So far, we have found that the inside bank premium is positive and, at least, marginally sig-
niﬁcant. However, it is still unclear whether this premium primarily comes simply from the
information advantage of the inside bank or from the implicit insurance based on such informa-
tion advantage.
One way to disentangle the insurance hypothesis from the information hypothesis is to ask
whether the inside bank premium, the coeﬃcient of DMLOAN1, diﬀers across primary banks
that are likely to have an informational advantage about borrowing ﬁrms and those that are
less likely to have one. More precisely, if a ﬁrm’s primary bank has an informational advantage
about the ﬁrm over its secondary bank, the primary lender is more likely to enjoy a larger
premium by becoming the ﬁrm’s sole lender. To this end, we examine a way of subsampling
based on the proxy for a ﬁrm’s informational distance to its bank, namely, a ﬁrm’s own report of
its perception about its lenders’ knowledge of itself, an indicator to measure the informational
29distance from a ﬁrm to its lenders that caters to our research objective and is unique to our
survey.
Question 28(6) in the survey asks a respondent ﬁrm to rate its lender’s knowledge about its
unquantiﬁable strengths one to ﬁve, where one represents “knows well” and ﬁve represents “does
not know.”21 This is a unique direct measure for the degree of a lender’s soft information about
a borrowing ﬁrm albeit a respondent’s subjective measure. Since a vast majority of ﬁrms (76
percent) answered that the primary lender and the secondary lender are equally knowledgeable,
we constructed two subsamples that are not mutually exclusive, namely, the sample of the
ﬁrms that answer that their primary bank is at least as knowledgeable about them as their
secondary bank and the sample of the ﬁrms that answer that their secondary bank is at least
as knowledgeable as their primary bank.22 The results of the maximum likelihood estimation
regressions are presented in Table 5. The regressions are run on the sample of ﬁrms that perceive
their primary bank as their main bank and that apply for a loan to multiple banks for which we
found the marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of DMLOAN1 in Table 4.
As is shown in Table 5, the coeﬃcient of DMLOAN1 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at least at the 10 percent level for both subsamples. The coeﬃcient is slightly larger and more
strongly signiﬁcant in column 2, which is the opposite of what the information hypothesis would
suggest. The diﬀerence by 14 basis points, however, is neither statistically nor economically sig-
niﬁcant. On balance, these results imply that a ﬁrm’s primary lender’s informational advantage
over its secondary lender is of little importance.
This could be the result of the relatively low probability of defaults of SMEs in the sample
year. The ratio of non-performing loan (risk management loans, Japanese Financial Services
Agency) over total loans of regional banks and cooperative banks, whose clients are mostly
SMEs, was 5.2 % in FY 2007. This implies that (1 ¡ ®)=® in the second line of Eq. (30) is
as low as 0.055, and so the portion of the premium explained by the information hypothesis is
21Two, 3, and 4 represent “knows considerably,” “knows fairly,” and “knows little.”
22Twenty-four percent of sample ﬁrms answered that their primary lender is more knowledgeable about them
than their secondary lender and 76 percent answered that their primary lender and their secondary lender are
equally knowledgeable about them. On the other hand, only 0.8 percent answered that their secondary lender is
more knowledgeable than their primary lender.
30estimated to be very small. The anecdotal evidence is also against the information hypothesis. A
number of banks we interviewed, which include both regional banks and community cooperative
banks; shinkin banks, agreed that there is little diﬀerence in the quality of collected information
about their borrowing clients between the case in which they are the largest lender for the
borrowers (the borrowers’ main bank from the bank’s perspective) and the case in which they
are the second-largest lender (the borrowers’ submain bank).
Now, the inside bank premium of considerable magnitude reported in Tables 3 and 4 is
unlikely to stem from the asymmetric information between primary and secondary banks; the
possibility remains that the premium is evidence that the primary bank charges a premium for
the liquidity insurance that the primary lender provides to its borrowers. To test this hypothesis,
we ran an additional maximum likelihood estimation with a subsample that consists of ﬁrms
that replied to a survey question that their primary measure in case of a temporary liquidity
shortage is to ask for a loan from their main bank (See Question 13 in Appendix 2). We also did
so with another subsample that consists of the former group of ﬁrms and those whose primary
measure is to ask their main bank to postpone repayments in case of a liquidity shortage. Both
estimations are done with the sample of ﬁrms that perceive their primary bank as their main
bank and that applied to multiple banks.
The estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Table 6. In either subsample estimation, the
coeﬃcient of DMLOAN1 is statistically more signiﬁcant than that estimated with the less focused
sample in Table 4, Panel B. Thus, the insurance hypothesis plausibly has more explanatory power
for the inside bank premium. These ﬁndings from the subsample estimations suggest that the
information advantage of the inside bank is not suﬃcient for generating the inside bank premium
but that the implicit insurance, or at least the reputation that the inside bank is competent in
telling apart temporarily distressed clients from permanently distressed ones and is willing to
properly respond to the renegotiation with the former is the primary factor to yield the inside
bank premium.
316.3 Comparative statics of the inside bank premium
We ran additional subsample regressions to conduct the empirical comparative statistics of
the inside bank premium. First, the existing theory predicts that loan oﬃcers at smaller and
decentralized ﬁnancial institutions have stronger incentive to acquire private soft information
about the creditworthiness of borrowers (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Stein, 2002), which results
in a more eﬃcient screening of a temporary ﬁnancial distress from a permanent one that is
the presumption for the implicit insurance. To examine this prediction, we estimated the same
model as that in the previous sections by the maximum likelihood estimation with the subsample
split by the median size of the primary bank, which is measured by the number of branches. The
median is 145 branches; this is comparable to a medium-size regional bank. Each subsample
consists of ﬁrms that perceive the primary bank as their main bank and apply to multiple banks.
Rows (1) and (2) in Table 7 report the estimated coeﬃcient of DMLOAN1 when the primary
bank is smaller than median and that when it is not, respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients
of the other control variables are omitted from the report. Clearly, the estimated coeﬃcient of
DMLOAN1 is positive and signiﬁcant only when the primary bank is smaller than the median.
This result seems to be consistent with the above prediction but may driven by the fact that the
group of smaller banks contains a number of cooperative institutions; Shinkin banks. By the
regulation, these cooperative institutions are allowed to lend only to member ﬁrms that hold a
share of the institution. Therefore, these institutions are more likely to serve as liquidity insurers
for their borrowers, who are, in turn, their ﬁnanciers, than the usual type of commercial bank.
To examine this point, we estimated the model with the subsample of ﬁrms whose primary bank
is a regional bank. The estimated coeﬃcient is still positive and signiﬁcant statistically and
economically (Rows (3) in Table 7). Thus, the data shows that bank size matters more than
ownership structure.
The result of some existing empirical studies show that larger ﬁrms are likely to borrow from
larger banks and smaller ﬁrms are likely to borrow from smaller banks (Cole et al., 2004; Berger
et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 2008). The larger banks need not or cannot acquire proprietary
32information as the larger ﬁrms are plausibly less uncertain and have a more established public
record and reputation. Thus, the diﬀerence of the inside bank premium could be driven by the
diﬀerence of sizes of borrowers. However, as is shown in Rows (4) and (5), Table 7, it turns
out that the estimated inside bank premium is signiﬁcant both in larger ﬁrms and smaller ones;
thus, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in our dataset, which consists of relatively smaller ﬁrms that
are not listed in the stock market.
Many empirical studies have used the length of relationship as the measure of the strength
of bank-ﬁrm relationships. To obtain information about the impact of a length of lending
relationship, we estimated the model in the previous section with the subsample of ﬁrms whose
lending relationship with the primary bank was longer than the median and with that of ﬁrms
who had a relationship that was shorter than the median. It is noteworthy that the sample
median is 37 years and is by far longer than 6 years in the U.S. (Berger et al., 2005), 7 years
in Belgium (Degryse and Ongena, 2007) and 15 years in Germany (Elsas, 2005). The estimated
coeﬃcient of DMLOAN1 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant only for ﬁrms with lending
relationships shorter than the median. This ﬁnding suggests that a lending relationship that is
too long could be worthless since the simple fact that the ﬁrm survives for so long is a public
signal for its creditworthiness.
Lastly, we examined the impact of the loan market structure on the inside bank premium
with the subsample split by the median of the Herﬁndahl index of bank branches. The estimated
coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant in competitive markets but not in concentrated markets.
This result sharply diﬀers from the existing empirical ﬁndings in other countries; relationship
lending is increasing in concentration in the U.S. (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Ogura, 2010), but
is U-shaped against the concentration measure in Germany (Elsas, 2005) and Belgium (Degryse
and Ongena, 2007). This is puzzling since the level of credit market concentration in our sample
(the median of the Herﬁndahl index is 0.17) is comparable to 0.18 in Germany and 0.15 in
Belgium. A detailed empirical investigation is required for a solid explanation of this diﬀerence.
337 Conclusion
In this paper, we found that the inside bank premium is positive and signiﬁcant on average
despite the competitive bidding by competing banks. The additional subsample regression shows
that the soft information regarding a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness that the inside bank holds has little
explanatory power for the inside bank premium, while the inside bank’s potential function as an
insurer for ﬁrms in case of temporary (not permanent) liquidity shortage has signiﬁcant impact
on the inside bank premium. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that the inside bank premium is better
explained by the insurance hypothesis, which is proposed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)
and Din¸ c (2000). We also ﬁnd that this inside bank premium is more signiﬁcantly observed for
ﬁrms whose inside bank is small in size and located in a more competitive loan market.
Despite these ﬁndings, there is room for other interpretations because we did not test the
impact of other diﬀerentiated services that can yield the inside bank premium as modeled in
Boot and Thakor (2000) and Yafeh and Yosha (2001). Moreover, we lack suﬃcient empirical
results to understand the interaction between the private information managed by the inside
bank and the implicit insurance or other diﬀerentiated services. In relation to this point, Dass
and Massa (2009) present the ﬁnding that the stronger bank-ﬁrm relationship tends to improve
the corporate governance structure in the dataset consisting of publicly traded companies. This
ﬁnding is supportive of the possibility of the asymmetric ability between the inside bank and
outside banks to provide monitoring or consulting services for borrowers. In addition, they also
ﬁnd that the stronger bank-ﬁrm relationship tends to increase stock trading motivated by private
information and decrease the market liquidity of the stock of the ﬁrm. Schenone (2004) also
ﬁnds that IPO underpricing is signiﬁcantly less severe if the oﬀering ﬁrm has a pre-IPO banking
relationship with its underwriter. These ﬁndings are supportive of the information advantage of
the inside bank.
A more direct statistical investigation on the relative importance of these hypotheses in
the context of more bank-dependent, more uncertain, and more informationally opaque small
businesses remains a future research subject.
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38Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 1 The range of ri is identical with the range of ro that is assigned with the positive
density g(ro) in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
(Proof) See the proof of Theorem 1 in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983).
Lemma 2 The expected return for an outside bank is zero in the equilibrium.
(Proof) Given that a bank wins by oﬀering ri(si) = ro = ˆ r, the expected return for banks is
¼iw = f¯i(ˆ r ¡ ½) + (1 ¡ ¯i)(c ¡ 1 ¡ ½)gI; (inside bank) (40)
¼ow = f¯ow(ˆ r ¡ ½) + (1 ¡ ¯ow)(c ¡ 1 ¡ ½)gI; (outside bank) (41)
where ¯ow ´ ®F(sijS)=f®F(sijS)+(1¡®)F(sijF)g, which is the outside banks’ posterior belief
about the success probability of the borrower after observing that an outside bank wins the







from Assumption (2), ¼ow < ¼iw. Therefore, by Theorem 2 in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983),
the statement in the lemma follows. ¤
From Lemma 2, setting ¼o = 0 and rearranging it gives the equilibrium bid by the inside
bank:
ri ¡ ½ =
F(sijF)(1 ¡ ®)
F(sijS)®
(1 + ½ ¡ c): (43)
The ﬁrst order condition for maxri ¼i is
df(1 ¡ G(ri))p + 1 ¡ pgn
f(1 ¡ G(ri))p + 1 ¡ pgN =
¡¯idri
(ri(si) ¡ ½)¯i + (c ¡ 1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ¯i)
: (44)
Substituting Equation (43) into this equation yields
df(1 ¡ G(ri))p + 1 ¡ pgN




39Integrating both sides from ri(¯ s) to ro gives the cumulative distribution function of the minimum
bid among the outside banks in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
f(1 ¡ G(ro))p + 1 ¡ pgN = F(ri¡1
(ro)jS): (46)
p = 1 since ri¡1(v) = s, F(sjS) = 0 and G(v) = 1. Thus,
f1 ¡ G(ro)gN = F(ri¡1
(ro)jS): (47)
¤
Appendix 2: English translation of relevant questions in The
Fact-Finding Survey on Transactions between Enterprises and
Financial Institutions
Question 13 What is the priority order for the following measures that your company could
take against the temporary deterioration of your company’s cash ﬂow? Please specify priority
order numbers (1-8) for each of the following measures.
1. Ask the major supplier to extend payment periods
2. Ask the major supplier to accept cuts in payments
3. Ask the major sales destination to shorten payment periods
4. Ask the main bank to provide loans
5. Ask the main bank to postpone repayments
6. Ask other banks to provide loans
7. Ask other banks to postpone repayments
8. Others
Question 28 The following questions are about your company’s transactions with the top two
ﬁnancial institutions that account for the largest and the second largest amounts of total loans
extended by ﬁnancial institutions to your company.
(1) Please write the name of the ﬁnancial institutions that extend the largest and second-largest
amounts of loans to your company.
40(2) Which ﬁnancial institution do you recognize as the main bank of your company? Please
choose one among the multiple choices below: 1. the ﬁnancial institution extending the largest
loans, 2. the ﬁnancial institution extending the second-largest loans, 3. other institutions
(institution name: ).
(3) Please ﬁll in the columns (largest lender; second-largest lender) for outstanding transactions
with ﬁnancial institutions at the end of the latest ﬁscal year. (Note) Leave the columns empty
if your company had no transactions with ﬁnancial institutions;
° 1 Outstanding borrowings (million JPY).
° 2 Fixed/time deposits (million JPY).
° 3 Length of commercial relations (years, note:the length of your commercial relations
starts from the year when your company borrowed the ﬁrst loan from the lender).
[ ¢¢¢ ]
(5) Please choose the services that your company receives from each of the largest and the
second-largest ﬁnancial institutions, respectively, as many as applicable; 1. settlement account
(current account), 2. transfers of employee wages, 3. investment and management of personal
and family assets, 4. acceptance of directors and employees from ﬁnancial institutions, 5. intro-
ducing new trading partners.
(6) Please evaluate each of the largest and the second-largest ﬁnancial institutions and the most
important supplier and buyer with respect to how well they know about each of the following
matters of your company by the following ﬁve-grade evaluation for each: 1. knows well, 2. knows
considerably, 3. knows fairly, 4. knows little, and 5. does not know.
° 1 Business conditions.
° 2 Cash ﬂow conditions.
° 3 Financial conditions.
° 4 Unquantiﬁable strength.
41Short-term borrowings in the past year (Note) Do not answer if your company has no
loans or if none of the answers is applicable. Short-term loans include one-year or shorter debt on
bills, bill discounts and overdrafts, excluding institutional borrowings from local governments.
Question 29 The following questions are about short-term loans from ﬁnancial institutions
in the past year.
[ ¢¢¢ ]
(3) With regard to each of the ﬁrst and second-largest ﬁnancial institutions in Question 28,
circle the numbers for all applicable answers.
° 1 Was there any inquiry for a loan from your company or the ﬁnancial institution in the
past year? 1. Yes, 2. No.
° 2 Did your company start negotiations with the ﬁnancial institution regarding the terms
of short-term loans? 1. Yes, 2. The institution rejected the inquiry from your company, 3. Your
company rejected the inquiry from the lender.
(4) This question is only for the respondents who chose “1. Yes” to Question 29(3) ° 2 above.
With regard to the negotiations with ﬁnancial institutions, circle the numbers for all applicable
answers.
[ ¢¢¢ ]
° 3 Did your company actually borrow from the largest or the second-largest ﬁnancial
institution?
The largest ﬁnancial institution: 1. yes, 2. no.
The second-largest ﬁnancial institution: 1. yes, 2. no.
(5) This question is only for the respondents who chose “1. Yes” in Question ° 3 above. Specify
the details of actual short-term loans for each of the loans made by the largest and second-largest
ﬁnancial institutions.
42° 1 amount (million JPY).
° 2 contracted interest rate (%).
° 3 secured by 1. collaterals, 2. the company owner’s personal guarantee,
3. a third-party personal guarantee, or 4. a public credit guarantee association.
Appendix 3: The results of the ﬁrst stage probit regressions (see
Table A1)
In this appendix, the results of the ﬁrst stage probit regressions for Panels A and B of Table 3


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46Table 2: The mean diﬀerence test for the contracted interest rate.
(Note) The mean diﬀerence test for the contracted interest rates of short-term loans are presented. ***,** shows
that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively (two-tailed test). The sample
in Panel (b) consists of ﬁrms borrowing from both the primary and secondary banks.
(a) DMLOAN1=1 vs. DMLOAN1=0
DMLOAN1 N Mean Std. Err.
1 379 2.210 0.042
0 756 1.973 0.029
Diﬀerence 1,135 0.237 0.050 ***
(b) The primary bank vs. the secondary bank
Lender N Mean Std. Err.
Primary Bank 536 1.914 0.034
Secondary Bank 536 1.877 0.032
Diﬀerence 536 0.037 0.017 **
47Table 3: Baseline regression
(Notes) 1. ***, **, and * show signiﬁcance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
2. Numbers below J statistic and log likelihood test statistic for endogeneity of DMLOAN1 are p values for
respective statistics. 3. 2SLS with a linear ﬁrst stage is the standard two-stage least square model where the
ﬁrst stage is estimated using a linear ordinary square model. Excluded instrumental variables are LNLOANS2,
FINANCINGCOST3, LNSALES, SETTLE2, SALARY2, and PERSONAL2. 4. MLE with a ﬁrst stage probit is
the maximum likelihood estimation where the likelihood for DMLOAN1 taking a value of 1 is estimated using the
probit model, whose independent variables consist of all the exogenous variables and a set of excluded variables
employed in column 2 (2SLS with a linear ﬁrst stage), namely, LNLOANS2, FINANCINGCOST3, LNSALES,
SETTLE2, SALARY2 and PERSONAL2. 5. Both Panel A and Panel B report the results for the sample of
ﬁrms that entered negotiations with two banks or more. Panel A reports the results for the unrestricted sample,
whereas Panel B reports the results for the sample that is restricted to the ﬁrms that perceive their primary bank
as their main bank. 6. Panel A reports the results for the unrestricted sample, whereas Panel B reports the
results for the sample that is restricted to the ﬁrms which perceive their primary bank as their main bank. 7. In
addition, 7 region dummies (dummies for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu) and
5 industry dummies (dummies for construction, manufacturing, communication and transportation, wholesale
and retail, real estate industries) are included to control for a ﬁrm’s demography. Kanto and “other” (ﬁnancial
and insurance and any other uncategorized ﬁrms) are base region and industry, respectively. The estimated
coeﬃcients of these dummy variables and the constant term are omitted from the table.
Panel A. Full sample regression
Variable OLS 2SLS with a linear MLE with a 1st
1st stage stage probit
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
DMLOAN1 0.071 0.046 0.203 0.140 0.219 0.148
LNSHORTLOAN1 -0.116 0.024 *** -0.118 0.026 *** -0.118 0.021 ***
SCORE -0.051 0.004 *** -0.051 0.005 *** -0.051 0.004 ***
LNTASSET -0.038 0.020 * -0.033 0.023 -0.033 0.024
OWNER -0.014 0.044 -0.010 0.047 -0.010 0.047
COLLATERAL1 0.093 0.051 * 0.089 0.054 0.089 0.054
PRIVATESECURITY1 0.103 0.047 ** 0.078 0.053 0.078 0.053
FINANCINGCOST1 0.024 0.080 -0.031 0.087 -0.031 0.091
FINANCINGCOST2 0.114 0.061 * 0.188 0.084 ** 0.187 0.090 **
LNLOANS1 0.068 0.017 *** 0.070 0.018 *** 0.070 0.017 ***
SETTLEMENT1 -0.026 0.072 -0.100 0.082 -0.100 0.081
SALARY1 0.016 0.047 0.022 0.053 0.022 0.049
PERSONAL1 0.040 0.044 0.030 0.047 0.030 0.047
HI 0.275 0.197 0.288 0.206 0.288 0.205
N 1,135 992 992
F statistic for excluded 21.07
instruments
J statistic (p-value) 10.397(0.109)
T test for endogeneity -1.06
of DMLOAN1
Log likelihood -1466.98





48Panel B. Sample of the ﬁrms that perceive their largest lender as their “main bank”.
Variable OLS 2SLS with a linear MLE with a 1st
1st stage stage probit
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
DMLOAN1 0.092 0.049 * 0.299 0.141 ** 0.322 0.152 **
LNSHORTLOAN1 -0.119 0.026 *** -0.119 0.028 *** -0.118 0.023 ***
SCORE -0.051 0.005 *** -0.050 0.005 *** -0.050 0.004 ***
LNTASSET -0.022 0.021 -0.008 0.025 -0.007 0.026
OWNER -0.009 0.047 -0.014 0.049 -0.015 0.050
COLLATERAL1 0.104 0.055 * 0.090 0.057 0.088 0.058
PRIVATESECURITY1 0.098 0.051 * 0.086 0.057 0.088 0.057
FINANCINGCOST1 0.051 0.089 0.008 0.095 0.009 0.100
FINANCINGCOST2 0.122 0.067 * 0.220 0.088 ** 0.228 0.092 **
LNLOANS1 0.061 0.020 *** 0.061 0.020 *** 0.061 0.018 ***
SETTLEMENT1 -0.056 0.088 -0.104 0.098 -0.103 0.095
SALARY1 -0.013 0.054 -0.004 0.060 -0.005 0.055
PERSONAL1 0.028 0.047 0.026 0.049 0.026 0.050
HI 0.199 0.209 0.225 0.216 0.226 0.219
N 980 873 873
F statistic for excluded 21.19
instruments
J statistic (p-value) 8.898(0.179)
T test for endogeneity -1.51
of DMLOAN1
Log likelihood -1291.94





49Table 4: The Results with the sample of ﬁrms with multiple loan applications
(Notes) 1. ***, **, and * show signiﬁcance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
2. Numbers below J statistic and log likelihood test statistic for endogeneity of DMLOAN1 are p values for
respective statistics. 3. 2SLS with a linear ﬁrst stage is the standard two-stage least square model where the
ﬁrst stage is estimated using a linear ordinary square model. Excluded instrumental variables are LNLOANS2,
FINANCINGCOST3, LNSALES, SETTLE2, SALARY2, and PERSONAL2. 4. MLE with a ﬁrst stage probit is
the maximum likelihood estimation where the likelihood for DMLOAN1 taking a value of 1 is estimated using the
probit model, whose independent variables consist of all the exogenous variables and a set of excluded variables
employed in column 2 (2SLS with a linear ﬁrst stage), namely, LNLOANS2, FINANCINGCOST3, LNSALES,
SETTLE2, SALARY2 and PERSONAL2. 5. Both Panel A and Panel B report the results for the sample of
ﬁrms that entered negotiations with two banks or more. Panel A reports the results for the unrestricted sample,
whereas Panel B reports the results for the sample that is restricted to the ﬁrms that perceive their primary bank
as their main bank. 6. Panel A reports the results for the unrestricted sample, whereas Panel B reports the
results for the sample that is restricted to the ﬁrms which perceive their primary bank as their main bank. 7. In
addition, 7 region dummies (dummies for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu) and
5 industry dummies (dummies for construction, manufacturing, communication and transportation, wholesale
and retail, real estate industries) are included to control for a ﬁrm’s demography. Kanto and “other” (ﬁnancial
and insurance and any other uncategorized ﬁrms) are base region and industry, respectively. The estimated
coeﬃcients of these dummy variables and the constant term are omitted from the table.
Panel A. Full sample regression
Variable OLS
2SLS with a linear
ﬁrst stage
MLE with a ﬁrst
stage probit
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
DMLOAN1 0.032 0.054 0.454 0.276 0.415 0.287
LNSHORTLOAN1 -0.125 0.028 *** -0.128 0.031 *** -0.128 0.024 ***
SCORE -0.056 0.004 *** -0.058 0.004 *** -0.058 0.004 ***
LNTASSET -0.018 0.022 -0.001 0.026 -0.002 0.026
OWNER -0.029 0.045 -0.052 0.051 -0.050 0.052
COLLATERAL1 0.051 0.054 0.040 0.060 0.042 0.060
PRIVATESECURITY1 0.149 0.051 *** 0.107 0.058 * 0.107 0.057 *
FINANCINGCOST1 -0.002 0.083 -0.043 0.095 -0.046 0.098
FINANCINGCOST2 0.120 0.064 * 0.239 0.093 ** 0.230 0.099 **
LNLOANS1 0.069 0.019 *** 0.063 0.021 *** 0.063 0.019 ***
SETTLE1 -0.036 0.080 -0.142 0.093 -0.141 0.090
SALARY1 0.012 0.052 0.032 0.060 0.031 0.054
PERSONAL1 0.089 0.047 0.086 0.050 * 0.086 0.052
HI 0.280 0.206 0.331 0.227 0.329 0.217
N 965 838 838
F statistic for excluded
instruments 5.79
J statistic (p-value) 9.19(0.163)
T test for endogeneity
of DMLOAN1 -1.57
Log likelihood -1191.29





50Panel B. Sample of ﬁrms that perceive their largest lender as their “main bank”.
OLS
2SLS with the linear
ﬁrst stage
MLE with a ﬁrst
stage probit
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
DMLOAN1 0.049 0.059 0.495 0.263 * 0.424 0.218 *
LNSHORTLOAN1 -0.131 0.030 *** -0.128 0.033 *** -0.129 0.025 ***
SCORE -0.058 0.004 *** -0.059 0.004 *** -0.059 0.005 ***
LNTASSET 0.004 0.025 0.028 0.029 0.025 0.029
OWNER -0.020 0.049 -0.048 0.054 -0.044 0.055
COLLATERAL1 0.054 0.059 0.031 0.063 0.034 0.063
PRIVATESECURITY1 0.143 0.055 ** 0.115 0.062 * 0.114 0.061 *
FINANCINGCOST1 0.022 0.093 -0.015 0.103 -0.019 0.106
FINANCINGCOST2 0.136 0.071 * 0.243 0.091 ** 0.230 0.090 **
LNLOANS1 0.063 0.022 *** 0.051 0.024 ** 0.052 0.021 **
SETTLE1 -0.067 0.105 -0.135 0.120 -0.134 0.107
SALARY1 -0.014 0.062 0.010 0.071 0.008 0.060
PERSONAL1 0.075 0.050 0.078 0.053 0.078 0.055
HI 0.228 0.220 0.278 0.239 0.276 0.230
N 820 726 726
F statistic for excluded
instruments 6.49
J statistic (p-value) 8.37(0.212)
T test for endogeneity
of DMLOAN1 -1.71
Log likelihood -1029.13





51Table 5: Subsampling results based on the relative informational advantage of the primary
lender (sample of ﬁrms that applied to multiple banks and perceive the largest lender as their
“main bank”)
(Notes) 1. ***, **, and * show signiﬁcance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 2.
Numbers below the log likelihood test statistic for endogeneity of DMLOAN1 is the p value. 3.The ﬁrst and
second columns in Panel B show the results for the sample where a ﬁrm reports that its primary lender is at least
as knowledgable about the ﬁrm as its secondary lender and the results for the sample where a ﬁrm reports that its
secondary lender is at least as knowledgeable about the ﬁrm as its primary lender. 4. The sample used in column
1 and that used in column 2 are not mutually exclusive. This is because 76 percent of sample ﬁrms report that
their primary and secondary lenders are equally knowledgeable about them. Constructing the mutually exclusive
samples would make the smaller of the two subsamples too small to run a regression. 5. Firms applied for a
loan application only from their primary bank and ﬁrms that do not percieve the largest lender as their main
bank are excluded from both subsamples. 6. The regressions are run using the maximum likelihood estimation
where the likelihood for DMLOAN1 taking a value of 1 is estimated using the probit model whose independent
variables consist of all the exogenous variables in the second-stage equation for SHORTRATE and LNLOANS2,
FINANCINGCOST3, LNSALES, SETTLE2, SALARY2 and PERSONAL2 as excluded instrumental variables.
7. In addition, 7 region dummies (dummies for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu)
and 5 industry dummies (dummies for construction, manufacturing, communication and transportation, wholesale
and retail, real estate industries) are included to control for a ﬁrm’s demography. Kanto and “other” (ﬁnancial
and insurance and any other uncategorized ﬁrms) are base region and industry, respectively. The estimated
coeﬃcients of these dummy variables and the constant term are omitted from the table.
A ﬁrm’s primary lender
knows about the ﬁrm
at least as well as
its secondary lender
A ﬁrm’s secondary lender
knows about the ﬁrm
at least as well as
its primary lender
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
DMLOAN1 0.385 0.215 * 0.525 0.175 ***
LNSHORTLOAN1 -0.144 0.026 *** -0.164 0.029 ***
SCORE -0.058 0.005 *** -0.056 0.005 ***
LNTASSET 0.019 0.029 0.001 0.030
OWNER -0.020 0.057 0.008 0.064
COLLATERAL1 0.017 0.065 0.029 0.072
PRIVATESECURITY1 0.107 0.063 * 0.039 0.070
FINANCINGCOST1 0.013 0.110 -0.034 0.120
FINANCINGCOST2 0.196 0.091 ** 0.168 0.094 *
LNLOANS1 0.064 0.022 *** 0.068 0.024 ***
SETTLE1 -0.080 0.112 -0.027 0.124
SALARY1 -0.008 0.062 -0.044 0.069
PERSONAL1 0.074 0.056 0.116 0.065 *
HI 0.245 0.241 0.136 0.291
N 685 547
Log likelihood -967.55 -725.83






52Table 6: Results to examine the insurance hypothesis (sample of ﬁrms that applied to multiple
banks and perceive the largest lender as their “main bank”)
(Notes) 1. ***, **, and * show signiﬁcance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 2.
Numbers below the log likelihood test statistic for endogeneity of DMLOAN1 is the p value. 3. Firms took out
only a single application and those that do not percieve the largest lender as their main bank are excluded from
both subsamples. 4. The regressions are run using the maximum likelihood estimation where the likelihood for
DMLOAN1 taking a value of 1 is estimated using the probit model whose independent variables consist of all
the exogenous variables in the second-stage equation for SHORTRATE and LNLOANS2, FINANCINGCOST3,
LNSALES, SETTLE2, SALARY2 and PERSONAL2 as excluded instrumental variables. 7. In addition, 7 region
dummies (dummies for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu) and 5 industry dummies
(dummies for construction, manufacturing, communication and transportation, wholesale and retail, real estate
industries) are included to control for a ﬁrm’s demography. Kanto and “other” (ﬁnancial and insurance and any
other uncategorized ﬁrms) are base region and industry, respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients of these dummy
variables and the constant term are omitted from the table.
Firms that answer that
they will apply for
a loan to their main bank
in case of a temporary
liquidity shortage.
Firms that answer that
they will apply for
a loan to their main bank
or ask their main bank
to postpone repayments
in case of a temporary
liquidity shortage.
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
DMLOAN1 0.564 0.196 *** 0.513 0.200 ***
LNSHORTLOAN1 -0.131 0.030 *** -0.131 0.029 ***
SCORE -0.057 0.005 *** -0.057 0.005 ***
LNTASSET 0.004 0.033 0.005 0.031
OWNER -0.024 0.062 -0.016 0.060
COLLATERAL1 0.011 0.072 0.012 0.070
PRIVATESECURITY1 0.105 0.070 0.100 0.068
FINANCINGCOST1 0.005 0.125 0.008 0.119
FINANCINGCOST2 0.317 0.101 *** 0.293 0.099 ***
LNLOANS1 0.058 0.024 ** 0.051 0.023 **
SETTLE1 -0.006 0.126 -0.047 0.120
SALARY1 0.018 0.069 0.043 0.066
PERSONAL1 0.054 0.063 0.054 0.061
HI 0.296 0.264 0.362 0.257
N 570 600
Log likelihood -784.48 -830.04






53Table 7: Regression results from subsamples sorted by various attributes (sample of ﬁrms that
applied to multiple banks and perceive the largest lender as their “main bank”)
(Notes) 1. ***, **, and * show signiﬁcance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 2.
The regressions are run using the maximum likelihood estimation, where the likelihood for DMLOAN1 taking a
value of 1 is estimated using the probit model, whose independent variables consist of all the exogenous variables
in the second stage equation for SHORTRATE and LNLOANS2, FINANCINGCOST3, LNSALES, SETTLE2,
SALARY2, and PERSONAL2 as excluded instrumental variables. The estimated coeﬃcients of DMLOAN1 in
each subsample regression are reported. The set of explanatory variables is identical to those in Tables 3-6 except
that the Kyushu and Chugoku regions are treated as one region in (8) and (9). 3. Subsample (3) consists of ﬁrms
whose largest lender is a regional bank. The other subsamples are constructed by splitting the dataset by the
sample median of the number of branches of the primary bank (1,2), of the logarithm of total assets of ﬁrms (4,5),
of the length of lending relationship with the largest lender (6,7), and of the Herﬁndahl Index of branch numbers
in the telephone area-code area where a ﬁrm is located (8,9). Medians are 145 branches, 7.48 (1.8 million JPY),
37 years, and 0.174. 4. Firms took out only a single application and those that do not perceive the largest lender









(1) Small banks 0.873 0.171 *** 339 -500.80 13.49 (0.000)
(2) Large banks 0.014 0.439 351 -410.54 0.32 (0.570)
(3) Regional banks 0.807 0.188 *** 426 -606.37 4.15 (0.042)
(4) Small ﬁrms 0.393 0.248 *** 345 -520.37 1.39 (0.239)
(5) Large ﬁrms 0.788 0.134 *** 345 -410.89 14.1 (0.000)
(6) Shorter relation 0.459 0.269 * 302 -425.24 2.36 (0.125)
(7) Longer relation -0.065 0.196 305 -410.81 0.56 (0.454)
(8) Competitive market 0.982 0.132 *** 344 -456.17 22.76 (0.000)
(9) Concentrated market 0.172 0.215 346 -471.66 0.11 (0.736)
54Table A1: First-stage probit results for Table 3
(Notes) 1. ***, **, and * show signiﬁcance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
2. The ﬁrst-stage probit model and the second-stage linear equation whose results are reported in Table 2
are estimated simultaneously by the maximum likelihood method. 3. Both Panel A and Panel B report the
results for the sample of ﬁrms that perceive their primary lender as their main bank. 4. In addition, 7 region
dummies (dummies for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu) and 5 industry dummies
(dummies for construction, manufacturing, communication and transportation, wholesale and retail, real estate
industries) are included to control for a ﬁrm’s demography. Kanto and “other” (ﬁnancial and insurance and any
other uncategorized ﬁrms) are base region and industry, respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients of these dummy
variables and the constant term are omitted from the table.
Variable
The ﬁrst-stage probit for
Panel A of Table 3
The ﬁrst-stage probit for
Panel B of Table 3
Marginal eﬀect Std. Err. Marginal eﬀect Std. Err.
LNSHORTLOAN1 0.000 0.018 0.007 0.019
SCORE 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004
LNTASSET -0.015 0.023 -0.029 0.025
OWNER 0.051 0.035 0.051 0.039
COLLATERAL1 0.059 0.043 0.073 0.046
PRIVATESECURITY1 -0.034 0.043 -0.064 0.047
FINANCINGCOST1 -0.007 0.074 0.001 0.081
FINANCINGCOST2 -0.279 0.058 *** -0.240 0.063 **
LNLOANS1 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.016
SETTLE1 0.097 0.053 * 0.106 0.063 *
SALARY1 0.026 0.038 0.025 0.043
PERSONAL1 0.042 0.043 0.031 0.045
HI -0.149 0.180 -0.259 0.209
LNLOANS2 -0.054 0.010 *** -0.049 0.010
FINANCINGCOST3 0.021 0.082 0.134 0.107
LNSALES -0.057 0.027 ** -0.059 0.029 **
BIS -0.008 0.007 -0.010 0.007
SETTLE2 -0.197 0.039 *** -0.238 0.041 ***
SALARY2 -0.105 0.038 *** -0.100 0.043 **
PERSONAL2 -0.136 0.048 *** -0.123 0.055 **
N 992 873
55